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ABSTRACT 
Objectives. Public health officials need tools to assist with anticipating the healthcare resources 
required to confront the SARS-COV-2 pandemic. We built a modeling tool to aid practicing 
public health officials with estimating healthcare demand from the pandemic in their jurisdictions 
and to evaluate the potential impacts of population-wide social-distancing interventions. 
Methods.  The tool uses a SEIR compartmental model to project the local spread of the 
pandemic. Users input case counts, healthcare resources, and select intervention strategies to 
evaluate. Outputs include the number of infections and deaths with and without intervention, and 
the demand for hospital and critical care beds and ventilators relative to existing capacity. We 
illustrate the tool using data from three regions of Chile. 
Results.  Our scenarios indicate a surge in COVID-19 patients could overwhelm Chilean 
hospitals by late May, peaking around mid-June at 7 to 50 times the current supply of beds and 
ventilators. A lockdown strategy or combination of case isolation, home quarantine, social 
distancing of individuals greater than 70 years, and telework interventions may keep treatment 
demand below capacity. 
Conclusions. Aggressive interventions can avert substantial morbidity and mortality from 
COVID-19. Our tool permits rapid evaluation of locally-applicable policy scenarios and updating 
of results as new data become available. 
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MANUSCRIPT 
1. Introduction 
On December 31, 2019, the regional office of the World Health Organization (WHO) was notified 
of a cluster of pneumonia cases of unknown origin associated with a market in Wuhan, China 
(Zhu et al., 2020). A novel coronavirus (SARS-COV-2) was identified as the cause of the 
infections (Zhu et al., 2020) and has since spread worldwide. As of April 8, 2020, more than 1.5 
million cases of COVID-19 (illness caused by SARS-COV-2) have been reported in 184 countries 
and territories, including ~90,000 deaths (Dong et al., 2020, World Health Organization, 2020). 
The pandemic has overwhelmed both national and local healthcare capacity in several countries 
(Ferguson et al., 2020, Kissler et al., 2020), and is projected to do so in many others. Low- and 
middle-income countries are particularly vulnerable (Walker et al., 2020), since financial and 
logistical challenges may hinder their ability to augment treatment capacity. As such, many 
countries have resorted to societal-wide social distancing interventions in the hopes of reducing 
morbidity and delaying the demand for healthcare resources, in order to gain time to increase 
treatment capacity. 
Numerous modeling efforts have forecasted the spread of the outbreak and examined the potential 
benefits of social-distancing interventions (Ferguson et al., 2020, Flaxman et al., 2020, Kissler et 
al., 2020, Walker et al., 2020). While informative, these efforts have been limited to specific 
nations and snapshots in time and public health officials are reliant on the authors for updated 
estimates as the pandemic evolves. Other internet-based tools offer public health users the ability 
to generate estimates on their own, but these are limited in their practical utility because their 
assumptions and desired results may not match the specific needs of jurisdictions and public 
health decision makers, or they require coding knowledge to access or modify the calculations 
(Healthcare, 2020, Henderson, 2020). These considerations are possibly more critical in low and 
middle-income countries, which may not have the resources to complete or modify such analyses 
on their own. 
Therefore, we developed a modeling tool for use by practicing public health officials to estimate 
the future impact of the CoVID-19 outbreak on the demand for healthcare resources in their 
jurisdictions and for examining the costs and benefits of various intervention strategies. Once 
downloaded, the model can be used without an internet connection, to assist public health 
officials with choosing locally applicable intervention strategies and by how much to increasing 
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hospital treatment capacity. For illustration, we apply the model to Chile, a Southern Hemisphere 
country where the virus is generating local transmission, and compare various interventions 
options in the three most affected regions of the country. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Tool Overview 
We created a spreadsheet-based tool (Supplementary Material S1) that uses a Susceptible-Latent-
Infectious-Recovered (SEIR) Compartmental Model to project the future impact of a COVID-19 
epidemic among any population of interest. The model requires information that is typically 
available for public health officials, including the number of cases in their jurisdiction, the size 
and demographics of their at-risk population, healthcare capacity, expectations for healthcare use, 
and choices of societal-wide social-distancing mitigation strategies users wish to evaluate. Model 
outputs reflect the potential demand on the healthcare system due to severely ill individuals with 
and without user-specified mitigation strategies, as well as deaths averted through treatment and 
excess deaths due to healthcare demand exceeding capacity. The demand for healthcare resources 
is measured as the estimated number of CoVID-19 patients requiring critical-care or Intensive 
Care Unit (ICU) beds, hospital beds (non-ICU), and mechanical ventilators over the course of the 
outbreak and the maximum occupancy at the outbreak’s peak. The tool offers users the ability to 
evaluate various intervention strategies currently under consideration and in use worldwide 
(Ferguson et al., 2020, Kissler et al., 2020, Willem et al., 2020). These interventions comprise 
five mitigation-type interventions which focus on slowing epidemic spread and reducing its 
burden on the healthcare system, and one suppression-type strategy, which employs aggressive 
interventions aimed at reversing epidemic growth (Table 1).   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Users can readily update all input values as new data become available or reflect a jurisdiction’s 
specific epidemiologic profile of disease and policy considerations. All calculations can be readily 
modified by users (although no modifications are necessary for tool use). 
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2.2. Calculations  
2.2.1. Transmission with and without intervention 
Our SEIR model tracks the number of individuals transitioning between disease states every day 
of the outbreak. The initial number of susceptible individuals is set as the population minus the 
cumulative number infected since the outbreak’s start. Transmission occurs through contacts 
between susceptible and infectious individuals and we assume an equal probability any one 
person has contact with another (“homogenous mixing”). We also assume transmission chains 
generated by infected travelers entering the population are minimal compared to existing 
transmission in the community. As a result, the number of new infections each day is the product 
of the proportion of the population that is susceptible, the number of infectious persons on a given 
day, and the average number of new infections each infected person causes over the span of their 
illness (the reproduction number; hereafter, “R”) divided by the duration (in days) of the average 
infectious period. Infectiousness is assumed to occur five days after infection (Lauer et al., 2020) 
and lasts 11 days (You et al., 2020). Upon recovery from infection, individuals are assumed 
immune to re-infection during the timespan modeled (through December 2020). In the absence of 
intervention R is 2.2 (low estimate) and 2.6 (high estimate), based on the early growth-rate of the 
epidemic in Wuhan (Li et al., 2020, Riou and Althaus, 2020). To account for uncertainty in R, all 
results are depicted as a range based on the low and high estimates for R. During time periods 
where interventions are applied, we reduce the low and high estimates of R by the values in Table 
1. Upon mitigation concluding, R returns to pre-mitigation levels to illustrate the potential 
consequences of shorter duration interventions. However, advanced users can alter the tool so that 
when one mitigation strategy concludes, another begins. Finally, we do not account for any 
vaccine as it is only likely to be available beyond the modeled time frame (Li and De Clercq, 
2020, Nature, 2020). All equations governing dynamics of the system are provided in the 
supplementary material. 
 
2.2.2. Hospitalizations and ICU admissions with and without intervention 
In our model, all symptomatic persons with an illness severe enough to warrant hospitalization 
will seek healthcare and the risk for hospitalization is age-dependent (Table 2) (Verity et al., 
2020). Similarly, the percentages of individuals admitted to the hospital requiring ICU care and 
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fatality are also age-dependent (Table 2), while the likelihood of patients admitted to the ICU who 
require mechanical ventilation is assumed the same (63.2%) for all ages (ICNARC, 2020).  
Based on observations for COVID19, we assume individuals seeking hospital care do so 11 days 
after infection (five days incubation + six days of symptoms) (Chen et al., 2020, Li et al., 2020, 
Linton et al., 2020, Zhang Guqin et al., 2020). We calculate hospital (non-ICU) bed occupancy 
based on a ten day length of stay for patients treated entirely in non-critical hospital wards (Deng 
et al., 2020, Wang Dawei et al., 2020) and ICU bed occupancy based on a ten day length of stay 
when critical care is required (Verity et al., 2020, Zhang Guqin et al., 2020). We assume a four 
day lag from hospital admission to ICU admission (Wang Dawei et al., 2020, Zhang Guqin et al., 
2020). When mechanical ventilation is required, we assume the duration of use is nine days, 
based on expert clinical opinion that ventilation is necessary for the duration of ICU stays other 
than two days (one-day lag post ICU admission to initiate ventilator use plus 1 day in the ICU 
post-use) and another day required for ventilator cleaning/re-equipping. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
To estimate the impact of interventions on hospital resource requirements we calculate two 
measures for each of the three resources tracked in the model: 1) the reduction in peak occupancy 
between the projected outbreak without intervention and when an interventions are employed, and 
2) the number of weeks peak occupancy is delayed due to employed interventions. 
 
 
2.2.3. Deaths with and without intervention 
We assume all deaths occur in the hospital unless treatment capacity is overwhelmed, and that it 
takes the same amount of time for an individual to recover and die, despite some preliminary 
evidence  that deaths occur faster (Deng et al., 2020, Linton et al., 2020). As such, we might be 
overestimating the healthcare resources needed to treat the most critical patients (namely 
ventilators). Given the limited evidence for outcome-based durations of resource use, we took a 
more conservative approach, assuming planners would prefer to overestimate resources needs 
than under-prepare. 
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With treatment, fatality among infected (IFR) is age-dependent (Verity et al., 2020) (Table 2). 
When hospital capacity is overwhelmed, we assume a 1% increase in the IFR, chosen to 
approximately double the IFR in Chile, based on the observed reduction in IFR in China after 
treatment capacity was augmented to meet demand (Zhang Zuqin et al., 2020). We also chose to 
base our mortality increase for untreated CoVID19 patients on hospital bed availability (versus 
critical care beds or ventilators) since the vast majority of cases do not require critical care (~90% 
of cases in Chile). When more data become available, these assumptions can be updated. Finally, 
we assume when beds become free at overwhelmed hospitals, new admissions are not associated 
with a patient’s potential outcome. 
To estimate the impact of interventions on deaths we calculate infection fatality rates with and 
without interventions and the number of estimated deaths averted as the difference in our 
estimates of cumulative deaths with and without interventions. 
 
2.3. Illustrative Scenarios and Sensitivity Analyses  
To illustrate the model, we estimated the impact of implementing three intervention strategies in 
three regions of Chile with the most detected cases through April 6, 2020: Región Metropolitana 
(RM), an urban region with the largest population including the country’s capital Santiago, and 
Araucanía and Ñuble, two of the least dense urban regions in Chile, but which have experienced 
rapid growth in recent weeks and are reporting treatment capacity may already be strained. We 
implemented the following three intervention strategies (Table 1) in each region: Strategy 1) 
Closure of schools and universities and Telework for 8 months; Strategy 2) Case isolation, home 
quarantine, social distancing of individuals >70 years, and Telework for 8 months; and Strategy 
3) Lockdown for 2 months (6 months shorter duration than the other strategies because the social 
and economic costs of this suppression strategy are not considered sustainable for the long-term). 
We chose these strategies because they are already in use to some degree in all three regions 
(Ministry of Health, 2020b, 2020c) (Supplementary Material 2). 
We conducted two sensitivity analyses to evaluate the effectiveness of varying the 
implementation of mitigation strategies.  First, we evaluated the influence of shortening the 
duration (by 2, 4, and 6 months) of mitigation strategies by which successfully reduced our 
healthcare demand estimates to within the range of treatment capacity. This analysis was chosen 
since policymakers may be pressured to lift mitigation strategies as early as possible due to their 
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social disruption and economic costs. Then we evaluated the impact of combining the Lockdown 
strategy with all other strategies, so that when the Lockdown strategy ends, another begins and 
lasts 6 months. This analysis is intended to address the potential for the outbreak to rebound in the 
absence of an intervention after a lockdown is lifted (Ferguson et al., 2020, Kissler et al., 2020).   
 
3. Results 
3.1. Infections and Deaths without intervention 
We estimate in the absence of any interventions, 6,034,008 to 6,470,288 infections would occur 
over the course of the epidemic (4/6 – 1/2/2021) in RM, 810,929 to 869,466 infections in 
Araucanía, and 406,482 to 435,781 infections in Ñuble (Figure 1 and Supplementary Material 
S2). These projected counts reflect the possibility that 85% to 91% of the populations in these 
regions may be infected in absence of any control measures or changes in individual behaviors. 
Under such a scenario, the number of deaths is projected to be between 104,062 to 112,403 in RM 
(1.7% IFR), 14,850 to 16,032 deaths in Araucanía (1.8% IFR), and 7,732 to 8,324 deaths in Ñuble 
(1.9% IFR).  
 
3.2. Hospital Resource Demands with and without interventions  
Without intervening to control the outbreak, demands for all three of the healthcare resources 
evaluated by our model are projected to exceed capacity approximately by the end of May in RM 
(Figure 1 and Supplementary Material S2), and peak sometime in July. Araucanía and Ñuble are 
projected to exceed capacity in early May and peak sometime in June (one month prior to RM on 
both metrics). The degree to which demand is projected to exceed supplies differs by region. In 
RM, peak demand across all resources is 7 to 14 times the projected maximum supplies available. 
The situation appears more dire in Araucanía and Ñuble, specifically regarding beds. In both 
regions peak demand for hospital beds are 10 to 20 times the projected maximum available supply 
and peak ICU bed demand is between 21 and 42 times the supply. 
Among the two mitigation strategies we evaluated (versus the suppression-type Lockdown 
strategy), Strategy 2 reduced the burden on the healthcare system the most. In RM, compared to 
the no intervention scenario, this strategy reduced peak hospital bed occupancy demands by a 
range of 32,012 to 55,281 (56.7-74.1%), ICU bed occupancy between 4,156 to 6,393 beds (64.7-
74.4%), and the number of ventilators needed by 2,181 to 3,266 (66.8-74.6%). This strategy 
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would also push the peak demand for healthcare resources back between 11 and 26 weeks, 
affording policymakers more time to plan or acquire more capacity. Similar percent reductions 
and delays in the peak demand were observed for Araucanía and Ñuble (Supplementary Material 
S2). 
Our results suggest that this strategy can ease the demands for healthcare to levels below 
projected capacity constraints when the effectiveness of this strategy is at the higher end of our 
assumed range (i.e. reductions in R0 approach 47.7%) (Table 1, Figure 1). 
For policymakers willing to consider more restrictive measures, our results for the Lockdown 
strategy, suggest it is an incredibly effective strategy, even for its short duration. The pandemic is 
quickly subdued and remains so for the duration of the lockdown period in all three regions, with 
the numbers of cases in treatment remaining relatively flat at levels well below treatment 
capacity. Once the lockdown is lifted the number of infected begins to rise again, resulting in 
demand curves similar in size to the no-intervention scenario, but peaking sometime between late 
August and early October (Figure 3, panel A). 
   
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.3. Deaths averted with intervention 
Based on the projected capacity to treat COVID patients in each region, the number of deaths 
resulting from patients being unable to obtain healthcare was 57,557 to 65,535 in RM, 7,726 to 
8,393 in Araucanía, and 3,937 to 4,256 in Ñuble. With Strategy 2, the estimated number of deaths 
averted in RM ranged from 43,288 to 86,609 (41.6-77.1%), between 6,166 and 11,557 in 
Araucanía (41.5-72.1%), and 3,087 to 5,923 in Ñuble (39.9-71.2%) (Table 4). Lockdown 
eliminates between 99.4% and 99.9% of deaths in all three regions during the lockdown period, 
but deaths rise afterwards with the subsequent rebound of transmission. 
 
3.4. Sensitivity Analyses 
Figure 2 depicts the effects of shortening the duration of intervention Strategy 2 on hospital bed 
occupancy demands in RM to two (A), four (B), six (C) months of implementation versus our 
initial eight month (D) duration. Similar to our baseline results for Strategy 3 (Lockdown), these 
results show that effectiveness of interventions depends upon the length of time they overlap the 
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epidemic period. Specifically, if too many susceptible individuals remain (i.e., insufficient herd 
immunity) at the time interventions are lifted, transmission will return. Even when interventions 
are less effective (R is higher), if the intervention remains in place past peak demand, the resulting 
outbreak may be smaller than when the same strategy is more effective (R is lower) but lifted 
prior to peak demand (Figure 2, Panel C).  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the results for combining a Lockdown suppression strategy with subsequent 
mitigation strategies in RM. The benefit of this approach are an additional one to two months 
delay in peak demand timing beyond delays afforded by each of the mitigation strategies on their 
own. This approach, however, has no effect on the amount of demand (i.e. peak demand is similar 
to the mitigation strategy without lockdown). 
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
  
4. Discussion   
In the absence of immunization, our illustrative results suggest the number of severely ill patients 
could overwhelm treatment capacity as early as late May to mid-June in all three regions of Chile 
we evaluated. Our projections also suggest that with immediate aggressive action to implement 
several combinations of interventions the current amount of hospital beds and critical care beds 
may be sufficient. In specific circumstances, regional authorities may find it easier to augment 
their current capacity (e.g. ventilators in Ñuble) along with some mitigation strategies to meet 
demand versus strictly burdening society with disruptive mitigations. Policymakers should be 
aware, however, that our results indicate that the more effective an intervention strategy is at 
temporarily suppressing transmission, the larger the epidemic will be upon lifting the strategy (in 
the absence of vaccine and changes in individual behavior). As such, it may be necessary to keep 
societal-wide interventions in place, or intermittently start and stop them again based on active 
monitoring of cases counts and treatment capacity, until a vaccine or treatment that can be 
administered outside of the hospital setting are available. 
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While our projections are reasonable estimates for how the pandemic may play out given our 
current understanding of SARS-CoV-2, they should not be considered as forecasts of what will 
occur. This is due to the uncertainty in our understanding of an outbreak that is still unfolding, the 
application of experiences of other countries to Chile (such as case severity, resource use by non-
COVID patients, intervention effectiveness, compliance over time), and case surveillance 
uncertainty. To address case surveillance uncertainty, users can scale upwards or downwards their 
case count inputs occurring over the prior two weeks based on perceived underreporting or 
overreporting and examine the influence on outputs (as we did in our illustrative scenario). 
Similarly, all assumptions and sources are explicitly presented in the tool, and all can be readily 
modified by the user to reflect their interests and as new information comes to light. Therefore, 
users should consider the value of this tool as its ability to support the evaluation of relative 
differences in results associated with “what-if” scenarios. 
COVID Surge has other limitations worth noting. Our estimates of beds and ventilators needed 
and the number of deaths averted also depends on associated resources not modeled here. Such 
resources include trained staff (respiratory therapists, nurses, and physicians) for the successful 
clinical management of hospitalized and ventilated patients and ancillary supplies associated with 
a bed or ventilator (e.g. electric circuits, oxygen, etc.). Furthermore, these resources may be 
impacted by the pandemic itself: staff absenteeism due to illnesses (Wu and McGoogan, 2020) 
and supply-chain disruptions in personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare personnel 
may further exacerbate the situation. The effects of seasonality on the transmission dynamics of 
COVID19 remains unclear, but the transmission of similar respiratory illnesses (e.g., influenza, 
syncytial virus) peaks in the wintertime (Lipsitch and Viboud, 2009, Shaman and Kohn, 2009). If 
COVID19 exhibits similar seasonality, or patients with these other illnesses place additional 
demands on the healthcare system, there may be even fewer resources available to treat COVID19 
patients at the epidemic’s peak. Finally, we do not differentiate between specialized pediatric and 
non-pediatric resources. While this is justifiable because the current pandemic does not appear to 
pose a great enough risk to children to overwhelm pediatric healthcare capacity (Riou et al., 2020, 
Verity et al., 2020, Wu et al., 2020), users of the tool should take note of this meaningful 
difference when providing resource amounts as inputs. 
 
4.1. Conclusions 
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Our model provides decision makers with the ability to examine the impacts of the current 
COVID-19 pandemic in their jurisdictions and evaluate the effects of various social-distancing 
mitigation strategies and augmenting treatment capacity on morbidity and mortality. The results 
of our illustrative scenario underscore the need for policymakers to take immediate and 
aggressive actions, and if they do so, substantial morbidity and mortality may be averted. As more 
data become available (e.g. new treatments or healthcare capacity is augmented) and the 
pandemic evolves (e.g. COVID case counts), our tool permits rapid updating of results applicable 
for making decisions.   
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Table 1. Intervention Strategies and Effects on Onward Transmission 
Strategy Name  Reduction in R0a 
(Strategy Type) Description Lowb Highb 
Case isolation 
(mitigation) 
Symptomatic cases stay at home for 7 days, reducing non-
household contacts during this period. Household contacts 
remain unchanged.  
15.8% 18.6% 
Closing Schools and 
Universities + 
Telework 
(mitigation) 
Closing Schools/Universities: Physical closure of all schools 
and universities (or move to virtual learning environment). 
Assumes some increase in contacts in the household and the 
community during the closure, partially offsetting reductions in 
transmission at schools and universities. 
 
Telework: All government switches to telework to the 
maximum extent possible and private businesses are 
encouraged to telework, resulting in 50% of the working 
population teleworking. 
15.8% 16.8% 
Case isolation + 
Household 
quarantine 
(mitigation) 
Case isolation: same as above 
Household quarantine: Following identification of a 
symptomatic case in the household, all household members 
voluntarily remain at home for 14 days. Increased transmission 
between household members during the quarantine period will 
partially offset transmission reductions in the community. 
25.4% 30.0% 
Case isolation + 
Household 
quarantine + Social 
distancing of >70s + 
Telework 
(mitigation) 
Case isolation: same as above 
Household quarantine: same as above 
Social Distancing of >70s: Reduce contacts among older 
individuals (>70 years of age) because of their increased risk 
for severe outcomes and healthcare resource requirements. 
These individuals reduce contacts outside the home by 50%. 
Telework: same as above 
41.9% 47.7% 
Lockdown 
(suppression) 
Population-wide social distancing by forced quarantine of all 
households and workplaces, and border closed to travel. Only 
essential outings from the home are permitted (e.g. 
food/supplies purchases) and for employees working at 
businesses deemed essential for continued operation. 
57.7% 68.2% 
Notes 
a R0 = basic reproduction number. It represents the average number of people who will be infected by any given 
infected person at the early stages of disease spread when there are no control measures.  
b High and Low values of the reduction in transmission associated with each strategy were used to account for 
uncertainty in societal compliance and strategy effectiveness. These reductions were based on equivalent 
reductions in Critical Care Bed Occupancy published in Ferguson et al. (2020) (Supplementary Material S2). We 
added 10 percentage points to reduction values for strategies including telework, based Willem et al. (2020).   
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Table 2. Risk of Healthcare Use and Outcomes Among Infected  
Age 
group 
% Infected, 
Hospitalizeda 
% of Hospitalized, 
Admitted to ICUa 
% ICU patients 
needing ventilationb 
Infection Fatality 
Ratio (IFR) a 
Fatality Increase if 
Demand>Capacity c 
0-9 0.01% 5.0% 63.2% 0.002% 1.000% 
10-19 0.04% 5.0% 63.2% 0.006% 1.000% 
20-29 1.10% 5.0% 63.2% 0.030% 1.000% 
30-39 3.40% 5.0% 63.2% 0.080% 1.000% 
40-49 4.30% 6.3% 63.2% 0.150% 1.000% 
50-59 8.20% 12.2% 63.2% 0.600% 1.000% 
60-69 11.80% 27.4% 63.2% 2.200% 1.000% 
70-79 16.60% 43.2% 63.2% 5.100% 1.000% 
80+ 18.40% 70.9% 63.2% 9.300% 1.000% 
Notes 
a Verity et al. (2020) 
b Based on ICNARC (2020). Alternative estimates include 60% (Meltzer et al., 2015) and 71.1% (Yang et al., 2020). 
c Percentage points increase in fatality when hospitals are overwhelmed. We assumed a 1% increase in the IFR to 
approximately double the population-weighted age-based IFR in Chile, based on data from COVID19 in China 
(Zhang Zuqin et al., 2020) 
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Table 3. Model Inputs by Region for all Illustrative Scenarios 
 Region  
 Metropolitana Araucanía Ñuble Source 
Populationa 7,112,808 957,224 480,609 INE(2017) 
COVID-19 reported casesb     
Cumulative 5,875 1,530 1,305 Ministry of Health (2020a) 
2 weeks through 04/06/20 4,525 1,383 1,043 Ministry of Health (2020a) 
R0 2.2 - 2.6 2.2 - 2.6 2.2 - 2.6 Riou et al, Li et al (2020)  
Intervention Strategy     
School closures, telework 4/1-12/1/20 4/1-12/1/20 4/1-12/1/20 Assumed 
Case isolation, home quarantine, 
social distancing>70, telework 
4/1-12/1/20 4/1-12/1/20 4/1-12/1/20 Assumed 
Lockdown 4/1-6/1/20 4/1-6/1/20 4/1-6/1/20 Assumed 
Disease severity     
Infected who are hospitalizedc (%) 4.5%  4.8% 5.1% Verity et al. (2020) 
Hospitalized, admitted to ICUc (%) 11.4%  12.2% 12.7% Verity et al. (2020) 
Infection Fatality ratec (%) 0.8% 0.9% 0.9% Verity et al. (2020) 
ICU patients needing ventilator (%) 63.2% 63.2% 63.2% ICNARC (2020) 
Healthcare resourcesd     
Hospital (non-ICU) beds  18,522 2,671 1,010 Latorre et al.(2020) 
  Available (%) 29% 29% 29% OECD (2019) 
Critical Care Beds 2,326 215 60 Latorre et al.(2020) 
  Available (%) 29% 29% 29% OECD (2019) 
Ventilators 867 80 22 Latorre et al.(2020) 
  Available (%)e 60% 60% 60% Wunsch et al. (2013) 
Notes 
a Population distributed by age groups are shown in the supplementary material, based on INE’s Housing and 
Population Census 2017 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2017) 
b Scaled counts to account for assumed 60% under-reporting in reported cases (based on Wang et al. (2020)).  
c Estimate by age group shown in supplementary material S2.  
d All beds available in the healthcare system, from public and private hospitals, are now part of the “Sistema 
Integrado COVID-19” under the centralized administration of the Ministry of Health. An intensive care bed (ICU) 
consists of a cot with a monitor, healthcare professionals and medication to treat patient. Some have a mechanical 
ventilator. There are an estimated 1,847 mechanical ventilators; 850 currently available and 997 were acquired in 
January 2020.(Latorre and Sandoval, 2020) We assumed the distribution of  mechanical ventilators was proportional 
to the number of critical beds in each region: Metropolitana,47.0%; Araucanía, 4.3%; Ñuble, 1.2% 
e Availability of mechanical ventilators was based on a three-year study of 97 ICUs in the US, including 226,942 
admissions to ICUs.(Wunsch et al., 2013) 
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Table 4. Deaths averted by each intervention strategy and region (compared to deaths without 
intervention) between April 1, 2020 and December 31, 2020 
Intervention Strategya Metropolitana Araucanía Ñuble 
Strategy 1: School closures, telework 8,666 – 15,957 
(8.3 – 14.2%) 
1,210 – 2,256 
(8.2 – 14.1%) 
614 – 1,129 
(7.9 – 13.6%) 
Strategy 2: Case isolation, home 
quarantine, social distancing>70, telework 
43,288 - 86,609 
(41.6 - 77.1%) 
6,166 - 11,557 
(41.5 - 72.1%) 
3,087 - 5,923 
(39.9 - 71.2%) 
Strategy 3: Lockdown b 103,971 – 112,223 
(99.8 - 99.9%) 
14,819 – 15,969 
(99.6 – 99.8%) 
7,706 – 8,274 
(99.4 – 99.7%) 
Notes 
a Implemented per scenarios in Table 3 and assumptions in Tables 1-2. 
b Values shown are based on deaths during the lockdown period only due to its short duration and the subsequent 
rise in deaths when lockdown ends (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Projected occupancy demands and capacity for hospital (non-ICU) beds in Región Metropolitana with and without 
intervention.  
 
 Notes: Solid curves: projections using the high estimate for the reproduction number. Dashed curves: projections using the low estimate for the 
reproduction number. Table 1 contains all reproduction numbers. Horizontal Red line: Hospital bed capacity. Blue shaded region: interventions in 
place.  
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Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis: Effects of the duration of intervention Strategy 2 (case isolation, home quarantine, social distancing of 
population >70 years of age, and telework) on hospital bed occupancy demands during the COVID-19 epidemic in Región 
Metropolitana by two (A), four (B), six (C), and eight (D) months of implementation. 
 
Notes: Solid and dashed curves reflect uncertainty in the effectiveness of intervention strategies (Table 1)  
21 
 
Figure 3. Sensitivity Analysis: Effects of a 2 month Lockdown Suppression Strategy alone (A) and followed by various mitigation 
strategies for 6 months on Hospital Bed Occupancy Demands: Closing Schools and Universities + Telework (B), Case Isolation + 
Household Quarantine (C), and Case isolation, Household Quarantine, Social Distancing of >70 years of age, and Telework (D) 
 
Notes: Solid and dashed curves reflect uncertainty in the effectiveness of intervention strategies during both the Lockdown period and Post-
lockdown intervention period per Table 1.
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Supplementary Material 1 (S1): This is the modeling tool. It contains all data and calculations 
used in the analyses. There are an English and Spanish version of the tool available for 
download: 
English: https://publichealth.gsu.edu/files/2020/04/Supplementary-Material-S1_Model-v1.0.xlsx    
Spanish: https://publichealth.gsu.edu/files/2020/05/SupplMatS1_Model_Espanol_v1.0.xlsx
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Supplementary Material 2 
This appendix provides further details on the methods used as well as additional results. 
 
SEIR Model 
The model consists of individuals who are either Susceptible (S), Infected but not yet Infectious 
(E), Infectious (I), Total Recovered and Died (D). It projects and tracks the number of 
individuals moving between these categories every day of the outbreak. Projections begin on the 
day following the date input by users for the last day of the most recent 2-weeks of cases 
available. On this date, there are only Susceptible and Infectious individuals. The epidemic then 
proceeds via a growth and decline process: As the number of susceptible individuals is depleted 
(once individuals are infected) the spread of the infection slows. The dynamics are given by the 
following equations such that on any given day t, the number individuals Susceptible, Infectious, 
and Recovered/Died are: 
 
𝑆𝑡 = −R/γ ∗ S𝑡−1  ∗  𝐼𝑡−1/N 
 
𝐼𝑡  = ∑ R/γ ∗ S𝑡−1  ∗  I𝑡𝑖/N
γ
i=t −κ
 
 
𝐷𝑡 = R/γ ∗ S𝑡−α  ∗  I𝑡−κ/N 
 
where:  
N is the population size, 
R is the number of new infections each infected persons causes with R = R0 when no 
mitigation strategy is in place and R=Re when a mitigation strategy is being used, and 
κ is the number of days needed to become infectious after being infected.  
γ is the number of days needed to recover (or die) once infectious. 
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Note: the Infected but not yet Infectious state (E) is not calculated each day in our tool (i.e. not 
given it’s own data column), but still contributes to the model by delaying when infected persons 
begin to contribute to the force of infection.  
 
Reductions in R0 Associated with Interventions 
We chose the reductions in R0 for each intervention strategy by determining the reduction 
applied to R0 =2.4 (no intervention) in our model which produced comparable percent declines 
and delays in peak critical care (ICU) bed occupancy from the “do nothing scenario” observed in 
Ferguson et al.’s 1 Figure 2. Table S1 shows how these were determined
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Table S1. Summary of values used for determining the reductions in R associated with interventions 
 Observed in Figure 2 of Ferguson et. al. Observed in CoVID Surge 
Intervention Strategy (A) Peak 
Occupancy 
(B) Weeks 
peak is delayed 
(compared to 
“Do Nothing”) 
(C) Beds 
Occupied 
(D) Reduction in 
Beds Occupied 
(compared to 
“Do Nothing”) 
 
(E) Median R0 (F) Peak 
Occupancy 
(G) Weeks peak 
is delayed 
(compared to 
“Do Nothing”) 
(H) Reduction in 
Beds Occupied 
Do Nothing 5/19/2020  -- 2700 -- 2.4 19,538*  -- -- 
Closing Schools and 
Universities 
5/26/2020 1 
 
2400 11.1% 2.25 1087 1 10.9% 
Case isolation 6/1/2020 2 1850 31.5% 1.98 831 3 31.9% 
Case isolation + 
household quarentine 
6/7/2020 3 1300 51.9% 1.74 590 5 51.6% 
Case isolation, home 
quarantine, social 
distancing of >70s 
6/10/2020 3 920 65.9% 1.57 417 8 65.8% 
Lockdown 4/15/2020 -5 5 99.8% 0.9 3 -11 99.8% 
Notes 
* Generated using 2,793 cases through March 31 for all of Chile (per population 17,574,003), and interventions beginning the next day (4/1/20) and continuing 
through the calendar year 
A-C: Estimated from Figure 2 Ferguson, Laydon 1. 
D: (CDo nothing-Cintervention)/ CDo nothing * 100 
E: Manipulated manually in CoVID Surge until columns E and G approximated columns B 
F-G: Observed in CoVID Surge 
H: (FDo nothing-Fintervention)/ FDo nothing * 100 
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Interventions Application Timeline in Chile 2,3 
Closure of all daycares, schools, and universities was mandated across all of Chile on March 16; 
followed by case isolation, and mandatory home quarantine for CoVID19 patients on March 19, 
and the implementation of flexible work schedules and telework for government workers began 
March 20. Social distancing measures across Chile include bans on nursing homes visits (03/16), 
closures of non-essential business (03/20, e.g., restaurants, pubs, night clubs), night curfews 
(03/22), and bans on meetings and events ≥50 people (03/24). Additionally, since March 28, two 
major cities in Araucanía, and seven municipalities in Santiago are under a mandatory lockdown. 
 
 
Table S2. Demographics of the Chilean population in the three study regions 
Age group  Chile Metropolitana Ñuble Araucanía 
 
  XIII XVI IX 
0-9 2,376,335 937,432 61,464 133,392 
10-19 2,392,112 933,218 66,179 137,493 
20-29 2,861,972 1,238,583 66,985 144,782 
30-39 2,501,414 1,066,451 60,993 124,652 
40-49 2,359,266 951,497 67,450 128,716 
50-59 2,232,733 889,726 66,574 120,577 
60-69 1,499,917 579,388 46,661 84,658 
70-79 879,498 333,994 29,403 53,289 
80+ 470,756 182,519 14,900 29,665 
Urban 15,424,263 6,849,310 333,680 678,544 
Rural 2,149,740 263,498 146,929 278,680 
Total 17,574,003 7,112,808 480,609 957,224 
Notes. Chile has a total of 16 regions. Here we include the three regions that have been more heavily affected 
by CoVID-19 as of April 5th 2020, since the first case was reported in march 2, as an illustration of the 
potential uses of the tool. Estimates for all regions have been reported to the Ministry of Health. 
Source: CENSO 2017.4 
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Table S3. Reported cases of COVID-19 by region 
 Region  N Total Two weeks 
Metropolitana XIII 2350 1810 
Araucanía IX 612 553 
Ñuble XVI 522 417 
Chile   5116 4194 
Notes. Total reported CoVID-19 cases as of April 5 2020 
Source: Ministry of Health5 
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Table S4. Healthcare capacity: basic and intensive care beds by region, public and private hospitals 
  Basic beds Beds/ Intensive care Beds/ Mech. 
  Current Increase† Total 100k Current Increase† Total 100k Ventilator 
Metropolitana 16,596 1,926 18,522 260.4 1,937 389 2,326 32.7 867 
Ñuble 942 68 1,010 210.2 38 22 60 12.5 22 
Araucanía 2,202 469 2,671 279.0 136 79 215 22.5 80 
Chile 37,777 3,929 41,706 227.2 3,295 1,659 4,954 29.1 1,847 
Notes.  
†Increase refers to new beds in the health care system as a consequence of CoVID-19 response. All beds available in 
the healthcare system, from public and private hospitals, are now part of the “Sistema Integrado COVID-19” under 
the centralized administration of the Ministry of Health. An intensive care bed (ICU) consists of a cot with a 
monitor, healthcare professionals and medication to treat patient. Some have a mechanical ventilator.  
There are an estimated 1,847 mechanical ventilators; 850 currently available and 997 were acquired in January 
2020.6 We assumed the distribution of  mechanical ventilators was proportional to the number of critical beds in 
each region. We assumed 60% of mechanical ventilators would be available based on a three-year study of 97 ICUs 
in the US, including 226,942 admissions to ICUs.7 
Source: Latorre et al. 20206 
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B. ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
B.1.1 Región Metropolitana – Hospital beds 
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B.1.2 Región Metropolitana – ICU Beds 
 
 
31 
 
B.1.3 Región Metropolitana – Ventilators 
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B.2.1 Región Araucanía - Hospital beds 
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B.2.2 Región Araucanía - ICU beds 
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B.2.3 Región Araucanía - Ventilators 
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B.3.1 Región Ñuble - Hospital beds 
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B.3.2 Región Ñuble - ICU beds 
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B.3.3 Región Ñuble - Ventilators 
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